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Making Mistakes about the Law: Police




While patrolling one night in 2014, police officer Jeff Packard
noticed a car with a hole in one of its red taillights.1 The white
light bulb inside was visible. Packard believed that Indiana law
required a taillight to be red and not to show white light, so he
stopped the vehicle. The driver, Kolyann Williams, had drugs
with him.2 Williams was charged and convicted with misdemeanor
marijuana possession.3 On appeal, Williams argued that, be-
cause Indiana law did not in fact prohibit other colors of light
from being emitted so long as red light is visible from a certain
distance away, the stop was unlawful.4 After examining the
statute,' the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Williams and
held that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.6
Shortly after the decision, the US Supreme Court announced
in Heien v North Carolina7 that police do not violate the Fourth
Amendment when they conduct a search or seizure premised on
a mistake of law, so long as the mistake was a reasonable one.8
In light of the Supreme Court's decision, the state of Indiana
t BA 2009, Thomas Edison State University; MA 2013, Northern Illinois University;
JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law School; PhD Candidate, Department
of History, The University of Chicago.
1 Williams v State, 22 NE3d 730, 732 (Ind App 2014) ("Williams I').
2 Id at 733.
3 Id.
4 Id. The practical goal of this argument was to get all of the evidence collected
pursuant to the stop suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
5 The statute allegedly violated was Ind Code § 9-19-6-4, which provides that "a
motor vehicle . .. that is registered in Indiana and manufactured or assembled after
January 1, 1956, must be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear
that, when lighted, . . . emit[] a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred
(500) feet to the rear."
6 Williams 1, 22 NE3d at 734.
7 135 S Ct 530 (2014).
8 Id at 536.
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asked for and received a rehearing of Williams's case, and the
court reversed itself after applying Heien.9 "A reasonable person
unversed in statutory interpretation," the Indiana court stated,
"would very likely" make the mistake of thinking that the statute
required that only red light could be emitted by the taillights.10
Officer Packard was mistaken but reasonable, and defendant
Williams's conviction was affirmed.
For many years, the Supreme Court recognized that police
officers can have probable cause (sufficient to support a search
without violating the Fourth Amendment) even if their suspicion
is based on a mistake of fact, so long as the mistake was reason-
able." Whether the same permissive rule should apply to mis-
takes of law was a question on which the courts of appeals were
split, with the majority of courts nationwide holding that it
should not. 2 The Supreme Court resolved that issue in 2014,
unexpectedly adopting the minority rule when it announced in
Heien that a search or seizure based on a reasonable mistake of
law is not a Fourth Amendment violation.3
Lower courts have applied Heien inconsistently.1 As it turns
out, it is far from self-evident how a court is to recognize when a
mistake of law is reasonable. The Court's opinion in Heien told
readers more about what the standard is not than about what it
is: the "reasonable mistake" standard is tougher than the stand-
ard for qualified immunity.16 This is not very informative.
9 Williams v State, 28 NE3d 293, 295 (Ind App 2015) ("Williams II").
10 Id.
11 See, for example, illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 183-86 (1990) (reviewing
Fourth Amendment cases on mistake of fact); Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160, 176
(1949) ("Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes . . .. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men.").
12 Prior to the decision in Heien, the Eighth Circuit held that police mistakes of law
could be reasonable. See, for example, United States v Rodriguez-Lopez, 444 F3d 1020,
1022-23 (8th Cir 2006); United States v Martin, 411 F3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir 2005); United
States v Smart, 393 F3d 767, 770 (8th Cir 2005). The DC Circuit indicated in dicta that it
agreed. See United States v Southerland, 486 F3d 1355, 1359 (DC Cir 2007). The other
circuits that considered the issue rejected the argument that a police mistake of law
could be reasonable. See United States v Miller, 146 F3d 274, 279 (5th Cir 1998); United
States v McDonald, 453 F3d 958, 962 (7th Cir 2006); United States v King, 244 F3d 736,
741 (9th Cir 2001); United States v Nicholson, 721 F3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir 2013); United
States v Chanthasouxat, 342 F3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir 2003). See also Wayne A. Logan,
Police Mistakes of Law, 61 Emory L J 69, 74-82 (2011).
13 Heien, 135 S Ct at 534.
14 See Part l C.
15 Id at 539 ("[T]he inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct
context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity."). Qualified
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Some courts have taken a forgiving approach to police mis-
takes.16 These courts reason more or less as follows: ordinary
people make mistakes, and if the law is complex, arcane, or con-
fusing, the police are reasonably likely to get the benefit of the
reasonable-mistake rule.17 In other areas of the law, ignorance is
sometimes thought to be rational. For example, it might be a
rational decision to not read contracts or licenses in full before
signing (or clicking "I accept").18 One might intuitively think that
such ignorance is sometimes reasonable. The same intuition
could apply in favor of a police officer trying to enforce a complex
and confusing statute. Surely one does not expect the police
officer to spend the time and effort of a lawyer (or a judge) to
figure out what the law means.19 But whatever its intuitive
appeal, this approach is in fact quite troubling in the area of po-
lice mistakes. Critics of the Heien decision have suggested that
the rule in Heien creates unseemly favoritism toward police,
according them generosity not accorded to criminal defendants.20
They have suggested that it is in tension with the principle
applied in most areas of the law-ignorance of the law is no
excuse.21
But not all of the lower courts applying Heien have been so
forgiving. Some have held that, when police have made a mis-
take about the criminal law in deciding that there exists proba-
ble cause for a search or seizure, the court should look to that
criminal law and decide whether that law is ambiguous.22 For in-
stance, one court suggested that there is "a condition precedent to
immunity protects officials from civil liability when the official has acted without violat-
ing "clearly established" legal rights that a reasonable person would have known about.
Mullenix v Luna, 136 S Ct 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam), quoting Pearson v Callahan, 555
US 223, 231 (2009).
16 See, for example, Karen McDonald Henning, 'Reasonable" Police Mistakes:
Fourth Amendment Claims and the "Good Faith" Exception after Heien, 90 St John's L
Rev 271, 305-08 (2016) (discussing the various ways in which courts have treated police
mistakes in a forgiving manner).
17 See, for example, Williams II, 28 NE3d at 295.
18 For rational ignorance in the contract context, see, for example, Shawn J. Bayern,
Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in
Contract Law, 97 Cal L Rev 943, 947-49 (2009).
19 This would, presumably, require spending substantial time studying the law,
learning how to do legal research in a graduate school context, and then actually con-
ducting research into the meaning of any relevant statute.
20 See, for example, John W. Whitehead, Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for the
Police to Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 9 NYU J L & Liberty 108, 117-18 (2015).
21 Id.
22 See, for example, Flint v City of Milwaukee, 91 F Supp 3d 1032, 1057 (ED Wis 2015).
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even asserting that a mistake of law is reasonable," and that
condition is "that the statute be genuinely ambiguous, such that
overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive
work."23 Another court has likewise suggested "that in order for
an officer's mistake of law while enforcing a statute to be objec-
tively reasonable, the statute at issue must be ambiguous."24
This Comment argues that requiring statutory ambiguity as
a precondition to a claim of reasonable mistake is the best way
to implement the rule in Heien.25 Further, it argues that the
ambiguity analysis should draw on the cases applying the rule of
lenity in substantive criminal law. The rule of lenity is a rule of
construction that provides that an ambiguous criminal law
should be construed in favor of the defendant.26 Courts have ap-
plied the rule of lenity rather sparingly in favor of defendants in
recent years. Generally, the courts have read a given criminal
statute with all the tools of statutory construction at their dis-
posal (including even legislative history as evidence of statutory
purpose) in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity before finding
that the rule of lenity applied in favor of the defendant.27 This
Comment argues that, in the application of the Heien rule, the
courts should use the same tools of statutory construction in
reading the criminal statute on which the police predicated their
search or seizure. Some scholars have suggested that the "rea-
sonable mistake" standard in Heien is in tension with lenity
because lenity reads ambiguity in favor of defendants and Heien
apparently reads ambiguity in favor of the police.28 This Comment
suggests that lenity can actually work in tandem with the Heien
rule. By drawing on the rule of lenity, the courts can foster the
symmetry between substantive criminal law and the law govern-
ing police search and seizure that the Heien majority sought.
The rule proposed in this Comment is that Heien should apply
23 Id (quotation marks omitted).
24 State v Eldridge, 790 SE2d 740, 743 (NC Ct App 2016).
25 This builds on a suggestion in Justice Elena Kagan's concurrence, Heien, 135 S
Ct at 541 (Kagan concurring), and on an argument in Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at
307-08 (cited in note 16).
26 See McNally v United States, 483 US 350, 359-60 (1987). See also Albernaz v
United States, 450 US 333, 342 (1981) ("[The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory
construction which applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of crimi-
nal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.").
27 See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 Harv L Rev 2420, 2428-31 (2006).
28 See, for example, Richard H. McAdams, Close Enough for Government Work?
Heien's Less-Than-Reasonable Mistake of the Rule of Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 147, 198-200
(arguing that Heien institutes a "rule of severity" that contrasts with the rule of lenity).
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(in favor of the police) in any case in which the rule of lenity
would be applied (in favor of the defendant) as to the statute on
which the search or seizure was predicated. In this manner, the
courts can develop the Heien doctrine so as to limit the police
discretion about which the Heien decision's many critics have
worried. Because the rule of lenity is applied only in a narrow
set of cases, the police will be limited to a very small universe of
cases in which they could claim to have reasonably misunder-
stood the law. Additionally, in order to argue that they reasona-
bly misunderstood a given law, the government will then be put
in the position of arguing that a law is so ambiguous that a
criminal defendant charged under the law should be acquitted
under the rule of lenity. This will presumably lead the state to
be cautious about how often it claims the benefit of the Heien
rule, lest they establish precedents about the rule of lenity's ap-
plication to specific laws that will benefit defendants in future
cases.
Part I describes the decision in Heien and the reaction to it
from courts and commentators. Part II sketches the doctrines of
qualified immunity and the rule of lenity. Part III argues that
Heien should carry a statutory ambiguity requirement while
Part IV contends that the rule of lenity should be used to guide
the ambiguity analysis.
I. REASONABLE MISTAKES, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND
HEIEN
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides, "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . ... 9 Reasonableness is central to Fourth Amendment
analysis.30 Searches and seizures are permissible so long as they
are reasonable.31 The courts have long recognized that a search
may be reasonable even though the police were mistaken about
the facts on which they relied.32 For instance, a police officer
29 US Const Amend IV.
30 See Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403 (2006) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.") (quotation marks omitted)..
31 See Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473, 2482 (2014).
32 See, for example, Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 185-86 (1990) (noting that
the Court "ha[s] not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual accuracy," and
that "what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly
2017]1 1565
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may misidentify a suspect, arresting and searching the wrong
person, and yet the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the
police officer's belief was reasonable.33 But what happens when
police make mistakes about the law? The police officer may be
right about all the facts, but still wrong to think that the
conduct at issue is prohibited.
A few years ago, Professor Wayne Logan noted the increas-
ing tendency of the courts of appeals to find that mistakes of law
could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.34 Logan
predicted that this trend would only continue. He suggested that
the trend created "an appealing symmetry with qualified im-
munity doctrine, which shields police from personal liability for
their reasonable mistakes of substantive law."35 In Heien, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of mistakes of law by law
enforcement officers, holding that reasonable mistakes by police
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment. But it also held
that the standard was not the same as the standard for qualified
immunity. This Part summarizes the Supreme Court's decision
in Heien in Part I.A, the criticism directed at the Court's deci-
sion in Part I.B, and the confusion in the lower courts in
Part I.C.
A. The Heien Decision
On a spring morning in 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse, a
police officer in North Carolina, pulled over a vehicle belonging
to Nicholas Heien on the grounds that the vehicle had a broken
brake light.36 The vehicle contained narcotics; Heien was arrested
and charged with attempted cocaine trafficking.37 Heien chal-
lenged the introduction of the cocaine as the fruit of an illegal
stop.38 As it turned out, under North Carolina law, it was legal
to have a single'working brake light. But on appeal to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, that court "concluded that, for
several reasons, Sergeant Darisse could have reasonably, even if
be made by agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they
always be reasonable").
33 See Hill v California, 401 US 797, 804-05 (1971) (upholding a search incident to
arrest, even though the arrest was made of the wrong person, because the "arrest and
subsequent search were reasonable").
34 See Logan, 61 Emory L J at 74 (cited in note 12).
35 Id.
36 Heien, 135 S Ct at 534.
37 Id at 534-35.
38 Id at 535.
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mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that both brake
lights be in good working order."39
The statutes at issue required that vehicles have "rear
lamps ... in good working order."40 Another subsection prohibited
the operation of a vehicle "on the highways of the State . . . unless
it shall be equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle."41
That same subsection explained that the "stop lamps ... shall be
actuated upon application of the ... brake. The stop lamps may
be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps."42
Another section required that "stop lamps" shall display red
light.43
The North Carolina appellate court held that "rear lamps"
are different from "stop lamps" (the former have to be lighted
during periods of reduced visibility, while the latter need only be
lighted upon application of the brake).44 Thus, the requirement
that all "rear lamps" work properly did not include "stop lamps";
it was sufficient that one stop lamp worked properly.45 The court
of appeals then concluded that the stop was unconstitutional
because the police were wrong about whether a law was being
broken.46
The North Carolina Supreme Court assumed for purposes of
its review that the statutory interpretation was correct. 47 But it
disagreed with the Fourth Amendment analysis. It reasoned
that it was "reasonable to read these two provisions of" the
relevant statute "to say that, because it may be 'incorporated in-
to a unit with . . . other rear lamps,' a brake light is a rear lamp
which, like all 'originally equipped rear lamps,' must be kept 'in
good working order."'48 The court concluded that the stop was
lawful, and the US Supreme Court affirmed.49
In the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John
Roberts, reasonableness was central. Invoking both text and
precedent, the Court cited its earlier decisions that described
reasonableness as the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
39 Id.
40 NC Gen Stat § 20-129(d).
41 NC Gen Stat § 20-129(g).
42 NC Gen Stat § 20-129(g).
43 NC Gen Stat § 20-129.1(9).
44 State v Heien, 714 SE2d 827, 830-31 (NC App 2011).
45 Id at 829-31.
46 Id at 831.
47 State v Heien, 737 SE2d 351, 354 (NC 2012).
48 Id at 358-59 (citation omitted).
49 Heien, 135 S Ct at 535.
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Amendment."50 The majority noted that the Court had long rec-
ognized that searches and seizures can be reasonable even when
suspicion is based on a mistake of fact, and then argued that
there was no reason to treat mistakes of law differently:
"[R]easonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mis-
takes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable
suspicion."51
Recent cases had talked only of mistakes of fact, but the
majority found historical precedent for its holding in a line of
nineteenth-century cases involving customs officials52 Constru-
ing federal statutes requiring "reasonable cause" (which the
Court considered synonymous with the modern conception of
probable cause)53 rather than the Constitution, these cases found
probable cause when suspicion was based on reasonable mistake
of law.54 The "construction of the law was liable to some ques-
tion," Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in one case, and "[a]
doubt as to the true construction of the law is as reasonable a
cause for seizure as a doubt respecting the fact."55 The Heien ma-
jority also relied on a more recent case, Michigan v DeFillippo,56
in which a criminal arrest was made under a law later declared
to be unconstitutionally vague. 57 The Heien majority read this
decision as relying on the principle that a reasonable mistake of
law could nonetheless support a Fourth Amendment search or
seizure and rejected petitioner's argument that the case should
be read as solely about whether to employ the exclusionary rule
as the remedy.58 The Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when a police officer makes a search
or seizure based on a reasonable mistake about the law.59
50 Id at 536.
51 Id.
52 Id at 537.
53 Heien, 135 S Ct at 536-37, citing Act of Mar 2, 1799 § 89, 1 Stat 627, 695-96.
54 As noted by Roberts, Chief Justice John Marshall had presented these statutory
cases as an exposition of the concept of probable cause, which, he noted elsewhere, "in all
cases of seizure, has a fixed . .. meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances
which warrant suspicion." Heien, 135 S Ct at 537, quoting Locke v United States, 11 US
(7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (quotation marks omitted).
55 Heien, 135 S Ct at 537, quoting United States v Riddle, 9 US (5 Cranch) 311, 313
(1809) (quotation marks omitted).
56 443 US 31 (1979).
57 Heien, 135 S Ct at 538, citing DeFillippo, 443 US at 37-38.
58 Heien, 135 S Ct at 538-39.
59 Id at 536.
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B. Criticism of Heien
The holding and legal reasoning of the Heien majority have
been widely criticized. "Heien is a riches of embarrassment," one
scholar has said.60 Critics faulted the majority's analysis at a
number of points, from its depth of analysis to its use of authori-
ties (drawing on old cases that were not even construing the
Fourth Amendment).1 Many warned that the holding in Heien
poses substantial risks. Scholars have argued that it "substan-
tially, and unjustifiably," expands the opportunities for law
enforcement abuse2 and legislative sloppiness,3 and that it
flipped the normal (sensible) view that ignorance of the law gen-
erally is not an excuse.6 4 The commentators argue that, if one
were to distinguish regular citizens and police, one should
expect the standard to be more demanding of police-not less.65
Commentators have argued that the decision hurts the legitima-
cy of the police,66 and even of the Supreme Court.67
60 McAdams, 2015 S Ct Rev at 148 (cited in note 28).
61 See Heien, 135 S Ct at 545 (Sotomayor dissenting); Kit Kinports, Heien's Mistake
of Law, 68 Ala L Rev 121, 154 (2016).
62 Kinports, 68 Ala L Rev at 124 (cited in note 61).
63 See McAdams, 2015 S Ct Rev at 150 (cited in note 28); George M. Dery III and
Jacklyn R. Vasquez, Why Should an "Innocent Citizen" Shoulder the Burden of an
Officer's Mistake of Law? Heien v. North Carolina Tells Police to Detain First and Learn
the Law Later, 20 Berkeley J Crim L 301, 334 (2015).
64 See Madison Coburn, The Supreme Court's Mistake on Law Enforcement Mistake
of Law: Why States Should Not Adopt Heien v. North Carolina, 6 Wake Forest J L & Pol
503, 525 (2016); Kinports, 68 Ala L Rev at 132-33 (cited in note 61); McAdams, 2015 S
Ct Rev at 181-84 (cited in note 28); Dery and Vasquez, 20 Berkeley J Crim L at 302
(cited in note 63); Miguel A. Estrada and Ashley S. Boizelle, Looking Ahead: October
Term 2014, 2013-2014 Cato S Ct Rev 337, 340-41. See also generally Whitehead, 9 NYU
J L & Liberty 108 (cited in note 20).
It should be noted that ignorance of the law does count as an excuse sometimes,
especially in the regulatory context. See generally Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the
Law as an Excuse, 86 Colum L Rev 1392 (1986) (arguing that the mistake-of-law defense
should apply when criminal law targets "ordinary behavior"). See also generally Mark C.
Winings, Comment, Ignorance Is Bliss, Especially for the Tax Evader, 84 J Crim L &
Crimin 575 (1993) (describing how the Supreme Court decided that the Internal Revenue
Code's use of the term "willfully" created an exception to the traditional rule that igno-
rance of the law is no defense). For a philosophical analysis of the traditional rule in
criminal law, see generally Mark Greenberg, Explaining the Asymmetry between Mistakes
of Law and Mistakes of Fact, 6 Juris 95 (2015).
65 McAdams, 2015 S Ct Rev at 148-49 (cited in note 28).
66 Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 311-12 (cited in note 16); Vivian M. Rivera, Note,
When the Police Get the Law Wrong: How Heien v. North Carolina Further Erodes the
Fourth Amendment, 49 Loyola LA L Rev 297, 314 (2016).
67 Lorenzo G. Morales, Note, Heien v. North Carolina and Police Mistakes of Law:
The Supreme Court Adds Another Ingredient to Its "Freedom-Destroying Cocktail", 52 Cal
W L Rev 79, 93-95 (2015).
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Anticipating some of this pushback, the Heien majority
expended some effort explaining that the basic principle (that
mistake doctrine should be applied to mistakes of law as well as
fact) was not an innovation but rather had a sound basis in
precedent.68 Still, the Court provided little exposition of what the
standard for finding a reasonable mistake of law might look like
until it considered another objection that might be made to the
decision-namely, that it might have the effect of disincentiviz-
ing police officers from learning the law. It treated this objection
briefly, simply explaining that the standard is an objective one, so
the subjective knowledge of police officers should be unaffected.69
The critics have not been convinced that this move is particularly
effective at restraining police discretion, and they have pointed
out that the objective test raises the possibility for different
kinds of manipulation. For instance, Professor Richard McAdams
has suggested that the objective test opens the door to after-the-
fact justifications of a stop, on the theory that an objectively rea-
sonable officer could have made mistakes to justify the stop even
when the officer was totally lacking a (subjective) mistake of law.70
The point of this brief survey of the criticisms of Heien is not
to engage this debate directly. For present purposes, there are
two points to make about the criticism of Heien: First, Heien is
caught up in a larger debate about police discretion. Second, the
Court did not provide much direct guidance as to how the deci-
sion can or should navigate this controversial field. This Comment
neither criticizes nor defends the Court's decision in Heien, but
instead takes the decision as a given and considers how the case
law can develop and apply the decision in a manner that is not
only faithful to the rule established by the Court in Heien but is
also sensitive to some of the concerns raised by the critics.
C. The Unsettled Standard for Reasonable Mistake
How does one know if a police mistake about the law was
reasonable? The Heien majority explained that the test is objec-
tive: "We do not examine the subjective understanding of the
particular officer involved."71 The standard was compared with
that of qualified immunity: "[T]he inquiry is not as forgiving as
the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether an
68 Heien, 135 S Ct at 536-38.
69 Id at 539-40.
70 McAdams, 2015 S Ct Rev at 175 (cited in note 28).
71 Id at 539, citing Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 (1996).
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officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a constitutional or
statutory violation."72 The majority took this to mean that "an
officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a
sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce."73
This was the only elaboration provided by the majority.74 At
oral argument, an assistant to the solicitor general proposed a
way of distinguishing the qualified immunity standard from the
reasonable-mistake standard. An officer, she said, should be re-
quired "to point to something in the statute that affirmatively
supports his view" before it could be considered a reasonable
mistake.75 But the majority did nothing with this suggestion.
Justice Elena Kagan attempted to provide further elaboration in
her concurrence. She echoed the majority in arguing that "the
inquiry the Court permits today is more demanding than the
one courts undertake before awarding qualified immunity."76
She argued that a mistake could be reasonable "when an officer
takes a reasonable view of a 'vexata questio' on which different
judges 'h[o]ld opposite opinions."'77 In other words, "the test is
satisfied when the law at issue is 'so doubtful in construction'
that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer's view. . . .
[T]he statute must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very hard question
of statutory interpretation."'78 The majority and Kagan's concur-
rence both insisted that the court was establishing a fairly
rigorous standard of evaluation in determining whether a police
error was a reasonable mistake of law.
Lower-court cases have been all over the map in their appli-
cation of Heien. The cases can be helpfully imagined on a con-
tinuum in terms of how willing the court is going to be in finding
that a police mistake was reasonable (and hence in compliance
with the Fourth Amendment under Heien). The courts that
evaluate reasonableness skeptically and impose preconditions
before finding that a police officer's mistake was reasonable can
be thought of as more demanding of the police. The courts that
find police mistakes to be reasonable with fewer preconditions
72 Heien, 135 S Ct at 539.
73 Id at 539-40.
74 It is criticized as unhelpful in Morales, Note, 52 Cal W L Rev at 96-98 (cited in
note 67).
75 Transcript of Oral Argument, Heien v North Carolina, Docket No 13-604, *51
(US filed Oct 6, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 5398228) ("Heien Transcript").
76 Heien, 135 S Ct at 541 (Kagan concurring).
77 Id (Kagan concurring).
78 Id (Kagan concurring).
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can be thought of as liberal, relaxed, or generous, in terms of
their treatment of the police.
At one extreme of this continuum are the cases that insist
on a demanding statutory analysis before police can be allowed
to claim that a mistake was reasonable. Several cases insist that
a finding of statutory ambiguity is a necessary prerequisite for a
finding that the police could make a reasonable mistake.79 For
instance, in one case, the prosecution argued that a police officer
had made a reasonable mistake in thinking that a statute re-
quiring a driver to signal 100 feet before making a turn applied
to requiring a signal 100 feet before pulling up to a curb.80 A
court applying the strict analysis rejected this argument: the
statute was unambiguous in its coverage and that was all that
mattered in determining the police mistake was unreasonable.81
When confronted with a statute misconstrued by a police officer,
these courts first examine the statute itself to determine if it is
ambiguous; if it is not ambiguous, the police officer cannot have
been reasonably mistaken.
At the other extreme are cases that have found that a police
officer could make a reasonable mistake when misreading even a
"clear and unambiguous" ordinance.82 The Indiana case described
in the Introduction is far at this permissive end of the spectrum,
with its finding that a mistake could be reasonable just because
ordinary people might misunderstand the statute.83 A tiny bit
more restrictive-but not by too much-is a California case, People
v Campuzano.84 The defendant, Felipe Campuzano, was riding a
bicycle at a "very slow, walking speed" alongside a friend who
was walking.85 A police officer stopped him for "riding on a bicy-
cle in a business district" in violation of the municipal code.86 In
the course of the stop, the officer noticed that Campuzano
seemed to be under the influence of narcotics and arrested him.
Campuzano argued that the evidence of his intoxication should
79 See, for example, United States v Stanbridge, 813 F3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir 2016);
Flint v City of Milwaukee, 91 F Supp 3d 1032, 1057 (ED wis 2015).
80 See Stanbridge, 813 F3d at 1037-38.
81 See id.
82 People v Campuzano, 237 Cal App 4th Supp 14, 20 (2015). See also Williams v
State, 28 NE3d 293, 295 (Ind App 2015) ("Williams II").
83 Williams H, 28 NE3d at 295. See also Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 307-08
(cited in note 16) (citing permissive decisions that have effectively- adopted the qualified
immunity standard in the Heien context).
84 237 Cal App 4th Supp 14 (2015).
85 Id at 16.
86 Id.
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be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal stop. The police officer
claimed to have understood the municipal ordinance as prohibit-
ing the riding of bicycles on any city block on which there was at
least one business. In fact, the court concluded that the ordi-
nance "limit[ed] the offense to operating a bicycle upon any por-
tion of the sidewalk directly fronting a commercial business
establishment."87 "The words of the ordinance," the court conclud-
ed, "are clear and unambiguous [] when read in context."88 But
because the officers had "no prior guidance" for interpreting the
ordinance, the court concluded that it was "objectively reasona-
ble for the officers to read the ordinance expansively."89 As a
result, the court found that the stop was legal under Heien. To
put it briefly, the Campuzano holding is that an officer can
make a reasonable mistake about an unambiguous law as long
as the officer did not have any prior precedents or guidance on
how to interpret the law. This may not permit quite as many
mistakes to be held reasonable as would the analysis of the
Indiana court in Williams, but it is still quite permissive in its
willingness to let police officers misread statutes.
These permissive cases have seemingly confirmed the fears
of the critics of Heien. The law might be clear, but the police will
still be allowed to misread it in order to conduct a stop or search.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND LENITY: THE BACKGROUND FOR
ANALYZING HEIEN
In the sections that follow, this Comment argues that the
Heien standard should be interpreted in light of two other legal
standards that involve mistakes about the law. The first and
most obvious one is the qualified immunity standard, which is
discussed here in Part II.A. This was referenced in the Heien
opinion, when the majority said that the standard for the mis-
take of law should not be "as forgiving" as the standard in quali-
fied immunity.90 In order to understand the Heien standard
properly, we must understand qualified immunity. The second,
and less obvious, point of reference is the rule of lenity, summa-
rized here in Part II.B. This canon of construction guides the
interpretation of substantive criminal law. It provides that when
a criminal statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in the
87 Id at 20.
88 Campuzano, 237 Cal App 4th Supp at 20.
89 Id at 21.
90 Heien, 135 S Ct at 539.
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manner most favorable to the defendant. This Part provides the
doctrinal background for the arguments in subsequent parts.
A. A Brief Introduction to Qualified Immunity
Federal law provides for civil liability for anyone who, under
color of law, causes the violation of another's federal rights.91
The statute providing for this liability, 42 USC § 1983, has gen-
erated substantial amounts of litigation.92 Its coverage is lim-
ited, however, by the doctrine of qualified immunity. As the
Supreme Court has explained it, "The doctrine of qualified
immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."93
The key element for present purposes is the requirement of
a "clearly established" right. In this respect, the qualified im-
munity analysis and the Heien analysis converge. For qualified
immunity, the Supreme Court has said that "[a] clearly estab-
lished right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right."94 The Court has not required that there be "a case
directly on point," but it still insists that "existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question be-
yond debate."95 "Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."96
Qualified immunity "ensure[s] that before they are subjected
to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful."97 As a
policy matter, qualified immunity has been said to "balance[]
two important interests-the need to hold public officials ac-
countable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need
to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
91 42 USC § 1983.
92 See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J
Empirical Legal Stud 4, 5 (2015) ("For the last four decades, [] litigation under Sec-
tion 1983 and the employment statutes has constituted the largest fraction of the
nonprisoner federal civil docket.").
93 Mullenix v Luna, 136 S Ct 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted).
94 Id (quotation marks omitted).
95 Id.
96 Id (quotation marks omitted).
97 Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 206 (2001).
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when they perform their duties reasonably."98 This immunity
applies to mistakes of both law and fact.99
Qualified immunity is quite forgiving of police missteps. A
brief digression into the recent development of the doctrine will
give a sense of how lenient the standard is in practice. There are
two steps of the analysis for qualified immunity,100 though they
need not be decided in order. The two steps, first set out in
Saucier v Katz,101 require a court to first "decide whether the
facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation
of a constitutional right"102 or a statutory right.i03 "Second, if the
plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide
whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the time of
defendant's alleged misconduct."104 As to the second require-
ment, "[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his con-
duct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on
qualified immunity is appropriate."105
This two-step analysis was generous to police and hard on
plaintiffs, and subsequent developments have made it even
easier for the police and harder for would-be plaintiffs. In the
2009 case of Pearson v Callahan,106 the Supreme Court held that
the sequence for analyzing these considerations was not manda-
tory.107 The "first prong" was "intended to further the develop-
ment of constitutional precedent," but on reconsideration, the
Court came to believe that "opinions following that procedure of-
ten fail to make a meaningful contribution to such develop-
ment"108 and that it was an unnecessary burden to require courts
to decide the constitutional issue even though it would not be
dispositive.109 This change to the order of analysis has been
98 Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231 (2009).
99 See id. See also Groh v Ramirez, 540 US 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy dissenting);
Butz v Economou, 438 US 478, 507 (1978).
100 See Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 731, 735 (2011).
101 533 US 194 (2001).
102 Pearson, 555 US at 232 (citations omitted).
103 See al-Kidd, 563 US at 735 (noting that a "statutory or constitutional right"
would suffice).
104 Pearson, 555 US at 232.
105 Saucier, 533 US at 202.
108 555 US 223 (2009).
107 Id at 236 ("On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that,
while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded
as mandatory.").
108 Id at 237. Among other things, "there are cases in which the constitutional ques-
tion is so factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases." Id.
109 See id.
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criticized for preventing the development of substantive rights
jurisprudence, which in turn makes it difficult to "clearly estab-
lish" a right,11o though defenders of this approach think that it is
justified because of its benefits for judicial economy.", Pearson
has focused courts on the "clearly established" issue.
The net effect of this modern qualified immunity doctrine
analysis is that it is quite hard for plaintiffs to prevail in civil
rights suits. Suppose that a plaintiff is seeking to make out a
novel constitutional claim; under the modified two-step analysis,
a court can deny the plaintiffs case without even deciding
whether a constitutional right has been violated. The plaintiff
will lose if the right simply is not clearly established. The former
system made it possible for plaintiffs suits to move the ball for-
ward incrementally: a losing plaintiff in a given case might suc-
ceed in establishing that a novel constitutional right in fact
existed, if the court has to decide that issue before considering
whether the right was clearly established. In the next case,
theoretically, another plaintiff could point to the preceding case
as precedent for the existence of the right. Because courts do not
have to decide the constitutional claim first, it is that much
harder to get to the situation in which one could prove a viola-
tion."2 The Court has recently added that the issue of whether a
right is "clearly established" must be evaluated with specificity,
which makes it even harder to show that a right was clearly
established.113 In that case, the Supreme Court faulted the lower
court for describing excessive force principles at too high a level
of generality.114
110 See, for example, Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Martin A. Schwartz,
Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 Touro L Rev
633, 647 (2013).
111 Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13D Federal Practice and Procedure § 3573.3 (West
3d ed Jan 2017 Supp).
112 See Blum, Chemerinsky, and Schwartz, 29 Touro L Rev at 647 (cited in note 110)
(analyzing how this framework allowed the Supreme Court to avoid a merits question
that it will likely be urged to revisit in the future).
113 See, for example, White v Pauly, 137 S Ct 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam). This built
on prior cases. See City and County of San Francisco v Sheehan, 135 S Ct 1765, 1777
(2015) (holding that it was not clearly established that police used excessive force when
they pepper sprayed and then shot a disabled person who threatened them with a knife);
Carroll v Carman, 135 S Ct 348, 351-52 (2014) (holding it not clearly established that a
police decision to knock on the back door rather than the front was an unreasonable entry).
114 See White, 137 S Ct at 552. The issue, the Court said, was not whether general
use-of-force principles were clearly established but whether there were other cases that
had considered a similar fact pattern and had established that conduct like the defend-
ant's was a violation of clearly established law. In that case, the defendant police officer,
[84:15611576
Making Mistakes about the Law
The qualified immunity standard has been controversial. It
has been criticized for underdeterring wrongful police conduct,115
excusing ignorance (very much in line with the standard criti-
cism of Heien),116 and silently making substantive judgments
about the scope of civil rights protection.117 Its lack of a statutory
basis has also opened it up to criticism as improper, even unlaw-
ful, judicial innovation.118
Whatever its merits, at least the doctrine has been devel-
oped for quite some time, and its contours are fairly clear.119
Readers of the Court's decisions know that the focus is on
whether a reasonable person would find a right to be "clearly es-
tablished."12 They know that this requires neither case law
directly on pointl21 nor specific holdings providing "that the very
conduct at issue in the case was wrongful."122 They know that
the law establishing a right must be clear enough that a "rea-
sonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right."123 They might be troubled with the results, but at
least the analysis is fairly clear.
B. A Brief Introduction to the Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a rule of construction or interpretation.
It requires courts interpreting an ambiguous criminal law to
arriving late to the scene of a confrontation, used deadly force without ascertaining
whether the earlier-arriving officers had behaved reasonably in precipitating the armed
conflict. Id.
115 See, for example, Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model
of Some of the Causes, 104 Georgetown L J 1479, 1519-24 (2016).
116 See, for example, Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused,
51 Vand L Rev 583, 584 (1998).
117 See, for example, Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64
Mo L Rev 123, 148-56 (1999).
118 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal L Rev *4 (forth-
coming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4UN4-8XQB.
119 See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U Pa L Rev 23, 35-47
(1989) (describing the origins and development of modern qualified immunity doctrine).
120 See, for example, Pearson, 555 US at 231 ("The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasona-
ble person would have known.'").
121 See al-Kidd, 563 US at 741.
122 Wright, et al, 13D Federal Practice and Procedure at § 3573.3 (cited in note 111).
123 Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 640 (1987).
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interpret it in the manner most favorable to the defendant.124
For example, when a criminal statute was ambiguous about the
required mens rea, the Supreme Court interpreted it to require
knowledge.125 The key question in applying the rule of lenity is
whether a statute is ambiguous, which can be defined as occur-
ring when a given law is susceptible to more than one (relevant)
meaning. 126
Two "classic"127 policy rationales have been proffered in sup-
port of lenity.128 First, it can be viewed as supported by the prin-
ciple of legality or notice-people should be able to figure out
what the law allows and what it prohibits.129 If a criminal law is
drafted in such a way that there is more than one possible
meaning, then citizens are unable to tell what the law in fact
permits and what it prohibits. The rule of lenity protects the cit-
izen by providing that he cannot be convicted of violating such a
statute. To put it another way, the rule of lenity puts the burden
on the state to create laws that are understandable to people
who read them. In Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's words, "[A]
fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if
a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as pos-
sible the line should be clear."130
Second, the rule of lenity can be viewed as a kind of
separation-of-powers principle, in which courts avoid criminaliz-
ing conduct when there is doubt that the legislature criminal-
ized it.131 As the Court has put it, "criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community," and this
is a matter for which legislatures are better suited than
124 See United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia) (plurality) ("The rule
of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants
subjected to them."). See also McNally v United States, 483 US 350, 359-60 (1987).
125 Liparota v United States, 471 US 419, 427-28 (1985).
126 See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 Cal L Rev 509, 512 (1994).
127 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L Rev
885, 886 (2004).
128 See Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 US
687, 704 n 18 (1995); Price, 72 Fordham L Rev at 886 (cited in note 127). These two
rationales (notice and legislative supremacy) have been criticized. See, for example, John
Calvin Jeffries Jr, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va L
Rev 189, 198-201 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
S Ct Rev 345, 396-98.
129 See United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 348 (1971).
130 McBoyle v United States, 283 US 25, 27 (1931).
131 See Bass, 404 US at 348.
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courts. 3 2 Criminalization of conduct has potentially severe con-
sequences for a defendant. So the rule of lenity ensures that the
court is refusing to extend a criminal law to cover conduct that
the legislature has not clearly covered. This is in short a kind of
prophylactic protection against the court going beyond that
which the legislature has provided.133 As one scholar has sum-
marized it, the rule of lenity "prevents the unelected Judiciary
from drafting criminal law in Congress's stead."134
A third proposed justification for the rule is one of democrat-
ic accountability. The rule of lenity serves to counter the tenden-
cy for the political branches to favor tough-on-crime laws35 by
imposing a judicial "one-way ratchet" in favor of defendants.13e
The legislature can still pass such laws if it is sufficiently clear
about what it is doing, but it cannot get a harsh result when
readers of the criminal law could be misled about the legisla-
tion's coverage. This is closely related to the legislative supremacy
point that the Supreme Court has recognized in the criminal-law
context. 137 The value protected is distinct, in that the separation
of powers focuses on preserving distinct roles among coequal
government branches, while the democratic accountability point
emphasizes the importance of public knowledge of the laws. This
could also be thought of as a rule of strict construction as a way
of ensuring that the public are prosecuted only for those crimes
that they should have known about.138
In an insightful article, Professor Zachary Price distin-
guished two judicial approaches to lenity based on lenity's posi-
tion in an interpretive hierarchy.139 When interpreting a law,
courts have multiple tools: text is the most important place to
look, while legislative history is consulted only (if at all) as a
backup if other options fail. One version of the interpretive hier-
archy, prevalent now, ranks lenity at the bottom; only if no other
interpretive tools resolve the meaning of a statute does the rule
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 Am Crim L Rev 695, 725 (2017).
135 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich L Rev 505 (2001).
136 Price, 72 Fordham L Rev at 894 (cited in note 127).
137 See Bass, 404 US at 348.
138 See John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 UC Davis
L Rev 1955, 2029 (2015) (advocating a rule of "strict construction of penal statutes" that
is more demanding than the current version of the rule of lenity).
139 See generally Price, 72 Fordham L Rev 885 (cited in note 127).
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of lenity apply.14o On this version, lenity is often invoked as a
supplement to bolster a narrow reading selected on other
grounds.141 A second version, associated with Justice Antonin
Scalia, ranks lenity second to text in the hierarchy. This version
invokes the rule of lenity as an argument against resorting to
legislative history or purposivism in order to interpret a statute.14 2
Scalia contended that lenity should be applied if a statute was
ambiguous when its text was analyzed and that it was inappro-
priate to separately consider legislative history or other extra-
textual evidence of purpose.143
Lenity has been employed inconsistently in the details, but
it is a real enough check on the legislature that some legisla-
tures have actually attempted to repeal the rule of lenity by
statute.'" Among the courts, the rule has retained considerable
support.14 Even in states that have statutorily abolished lenity,
courts have often ignored or cabined these statutes.1 46
In sum, the legal values protected by lenity are important
ones. The rule of lenity stands as a check on criminal prosecu-
tions when the law is less than clear. This function should not be
underestimated in a time of mass incarceration and high rates
of criminalization.147 The Supreme Court has in recent years pre-
ferred to construe statutes as clear enough to prevent the rule of
140 Id at 891, citing Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 108 (1990). See also Yates v
United States, 135 S Ct 1074, 1088 (2015) (Ginsburg) (plurality) (invoking lenity as a
backup argument); Chapman v United States, 500 US 453, 463 (1991) ('The rule of lenity,
however, is not applicable unless there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the lan-
guage and structure of the Act ... . [It] comes into operation at the end of the process of
construing what Congress has expressed.") (quotation marks omitted).
141 See Price, 72 Fordham L Rev at 891 (cited in note 127) ("[L]enity tends to appear
in opinions only as a supplemental rationale when narrow readings are chosen for other
reasons.").
142 Id at 891-92, citing Moskal, 498 US at 132 (Scalia dissenting). See also Zachary
Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity (SCOTUSblog, Sept 2, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/KA9P-BN23.
143 See United States v R.L.C., 503 US 291, 307-09 (1992) (Scalia concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Moskal, 498 US at 131-32 (Scalia dissenting). See also
Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity,
29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197, 213-19 (1994).
144 See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 57,
58 (1998); Jeffrey A. Love, Comment, Fair Notice about Fair Notice, 121 Yale L J 2395,
2397-99 (2012).
145 Solan, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 58, 122 (cited in note 144) (observing that when
the courts do not have any "other basis for deciding what to do," they "resort to lenity
even in jurisdictions that eliminated the doctrine legislatively more than one hundred
years ago").
146 Love, Comment, 121 Yale L J at 2398-99 (cited in note 144).
147 Hopwood, 54 Am Crim L Rev at 699-709 (cited in note 134).
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lenity from being applied.148 Still, the rule has proven durable,
and, at least at the margins, it continues to have the potential to
make a difference in criminal prosecutions and in the drafting of
legislation.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND REASONABLE MISTAKES: TOWARD
A STATUTORY AMBIGUITY ANALYSIS
The Heien majority's comment about qualified immunity is
the only concrete guidance that the Court provided as to how to
identify reasonable mistakes. It provides a minimal require-
ment, to be sure: in the Fourth Amendment context, it invali-
dates some police conduct that would be protected under quali-
fied immunity.149 Some courts and commentators have gone a
step further, looking for actual statutory ambiguity as a prereq-
uisite for a claim of reasonable mistake.150 This Part argues that
this is the best approach to implementing Heien and that two
other alternative approaches are unsatisfactory. Part III.A re-
views the minimal requirements that can be deduced from the
Heien Court's reference to qualified immunity. Part III.B argues
that an ambiguity test is the best way of fleshing out the Court's
instruction. Part III.C notes alternative ways of understanding
the "reasonable mistake" standard but argues that they are not
satisfactory.
A. "More Demanding" Than Qualified Immunity: Heien's
Minimal Requirement
The standards in Heien and in qualified immunity have par-
allels.151 Both standards are objective.152 The qualified immunity
standard "shields government officials from civil damages liabil-
ity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right
that was clearly established at the time of the challenged
148 See, for example, Muscarello v United States, 524 US 125, 139 (1998) (requiring
a "grievous ambiguity" before applying lenity).
149 Heien, 135 S Ct at 539 (noting that its test is "not as forgiving" as the qualified
immunity test).
150 See, for example, Flint v City of Milwaukee, 91 F Supp 3d 1032, 1057 (ED Wis 2015).
151 See Logan, 61 Emory L J at 74 (cited in note 12) (suggesting, pre-Heien, that it
could be argued that holding that reasonable mistakes of law are not violations of the
Fourth Amendment creates "an appealing symmetry with qualified immunity doctrine,
which shields police from personal liability for their reasonable mistakes of substantive law").
152 Heien, 135 S Ct at 539; Wright, et al, 13D Federal Practice and Procedure at
§ 3573.3 (cited in note 111).
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conduct."153 Heien gives police the benefit of the doubt in the
Fourth Amendment context.15 4 Heien and qualified immunity
can be seen as two approaches to the same end: providing police
with more leeway.
But the differences are more important than the similari-
ties. As noted already, the Heien majority said that the proper
test would be an "inquiry [that] is not as forgiving" as the one
employed in qualified immunity.155 In concurrence, Justice Kagan
likewise emphasized that the test under Heien is "more demand-
ing" than the qualified immunity test.156 The qualified immunity
standard will protect the law enforcement officer so long as ex-
isting precedent did not place the statutory or constitutional
question "beyond debate."17 The Heien standard must allow the
law to be a little less settled than this. Indeed, if Heien and qual-
ified immunity were the same, then there would be no Fourth
Amendment violation at all whenever a legal violation was not
clearly established. Qualified immunity would essentially disap-
pear in the context of Fourth Amendment mistakes of law. To
put it differently, if it means anything to say (as do the Heien
majority and concurrence) that Heien is more demanding than
qualified immunity, it must at least mean that there are cases in
which Heien does not apply but qualified immunity does.158
This does not tell us much, but it is enough to suggest that
some of the most liberal cases applying Heien to protect police
officers were wrongly analyzed. Consider the Indiana case dis-
cussed in the Introduction.19 That court did not ask whether the
law was clearly established but just whether a reasonable per-
son unfamiliar with statutory interpretation might misunder-
stand it.160 This can be understood as essentially the same as
153 Reichle v Howards, 566 US 658, 664 (2012).
154 See Steven D. Schwinn, Can an Officer Stop a Car Based on a Mistake of Law?
(Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Oct 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.ccUD8P-GZ59.
155 Heien, 135 S Ct at 539.
156 Id at 541 (Kagan concurring).
157 Mullenix v Luna, 136 S Ct 305, 309 (2015).
158 See, for example, United States v Longoria, 183 F Supp 3d 1164, 1181 (ND Fla
2016) ("So it is possible to say-and indeed this is what this Court is saying-that [the
officer] was acting in good faith, was not 'plainly incompetent' by any stretch of the imag-
ination, and yet also made an 'unreasonable' mistake within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
159 See generally Williams v State, 28 NE3d 293 (Ind App 2015) ("Williams II").
160 See id at 295. See also Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 307-08 (cited in note 16)
(analyzing decisions that have adopted something close to the qualified immunity stand-
ard in the Heien context).
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qualified immunity-the officer gets the benefit of the doubt
unless the law is something close to being clearly established, or
so clear that there is really no possibility of mistake. Indeed, it
might even end up more forgiving than qualified immunity
because of the troublingly subjective reference to the "reasonable
person unversed in statutory interpretation."161 In these courts,
the test is still formally an objective test, but it has. essentially
built into its definition the idea that the reasonable police officer
does not know how to read statutes. One could imagine this line
being elaborated in a future case to forgive a police mistake be-
cause the officer did not know of a judicial construction of a
statute-even if that judicial construction would make the
matter "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity.
In other words, the analysis used by the Indiana court would (if
applied as a general rule) probably lead to conflicts with the
Heien Court's test.
B. Toward an Ambiguity Test
Aside from its reference to qualified immunity, the Heien
majority opinion did not provide any guidance on the appropri-
ate rigor of the standard for establishing reasonable mistakes of
law. Kagan's concurrence included a one-sentence suggestion of
an ambiguity standard: "If the statute is genuinely ambiguous,
such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard in-
terpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mis-
take."i12 The test can be stated simply: in order for a mistake of
law to qualify as reasonable under Heien, the court must find
that the law on which the search or seizure was predicated was
ambiguous.163 While it is not clear that Kagan intended for this
ambiguity test to be the definitive requirement for applying
Heien, such a test brings helpful clarity to the field. In applying
Heien, courts would do well to inquire whether the predicate
161 Williams H, 28 NE3d at 295.
162 Heien, 135 S Ct at 541 (Kagan concurring). While Kagan also stated an alterna-
tive formulation (discussed in Part III.C), what this Comment is calling the "ambiguity
analysis" is the clearest and, as this Part will argue, provides the most practical test for
courts to apply.
163 Note that in Heien and in most subsequent cases involving its application, there
are two criminal laws at issue: one, the offense (usually a traffic offense) that provided
the basis for the stop; the other, the law under which the defendant was charged (in Heien,
a narcotics law). This Comment will call the former the "predicate statute," and it is the
statute about which the police officer was mistaken.
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offense is ambiguous; only if it is could a police officer claim to
be reasonably mistaken about its meaning.
Several courts have adopted this gloss on Heien, as have
some commentators.1 64 A district court in Wisconsin held that a
determination that a statute is ambiguous is "a condition prece-
dent to even asserting that a mistake of law is reasonable."165
Without being quite so direct, several other courts also collapsed
the reasonableness inquiry into an analysis of statutory ambigu-
ity.166 They were right to do so, but the rationale they offered
was disappointingly thin. The Seventh, Second, and First Circuits
all made findings about statutory ambiguity an important part
of their analysis, but with very little effort to explain this move.
The First and Second Circuits cited Kagan's concurrence,1 67 the
Second Circuit asserted without argument that the Heien major-
ity found the North Carolina statute to be ambiguous (which it
did not explicitly do),168 and the Seventh Circuit cited one of its
own prior cases that did not even discuss ambiguity.169 But there
are good reasons for making this turn toward an ambiguity test.
First, directing the focus toward the statute at issue rather
than on the statute's reader is a practical way of implementing
the Heien Court's insistence that the test is objective.170 The am-
biguity test directs the attention away from the officer and thus
away from the subjective analysis which the Court explicitly re-
jected in Heien.171 By focusing on the statute, this analysis would
164 See, for example, Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 312-20 (cited in note 16); Mint,
91 F Supp 3d at 1057. Note that the Flint court went on to hold that there was a subjective-
reliance requirement as well. Flint, 91 F Supp 3d at 1059 ("Officers cannot shore up their
lack of knowledge by proposing that if they had properly reviewed the law they would
have been nonetheless confused, thus justifying their mistake."). The Flint case was ref-
erenced as a model for applying Heien in Morales, Note, 52 Cal W L Rev at 104-06 (cited
in note 67).
165 Flint, 91 F Supp 3d at 1057.
166 See, for example, United States v Lawrence, 675 Fed Appx 1, 5-6 (1st Cir 2017);
United States v Stanbridge, 813 F3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir 2016) (glossing Heien as "con-
cluding that police officer's mistaken belief that ambiguous vehicle code required more
than one functional brake light was objectively reasonable," though without any detailed
consideration of the Heien opinion itself); Northrup v City of Toledo Police Department,
785 F3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir 2015); State v Eldridge, 790 SE2d 740, 743-44 (NC App
2016).
167 See Lawrence, 675 Fed Appx at 4; United States v Diaz, 854 F3d 197, 203-04 (2d
Cir 2017).
168 See Diaz, 854 F3d at 204.
169 See Stanbridge, 813 F3d at 1037, citing United States v Flores, 798 F3d 645,
649-50 (7th Cir 2015).
170 See Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 311-13 (cited in note 16).
171 See Heien, 135 S Ct at 539; Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 308 (cited in note 16).
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mirror qualified immunity, in which the focus is on how clear
the relevant case law is at establishing the right in question.
But it would set the standard at a more demanding level, also as
per the Heien majority's instructions. In qualified immunity, a
right is "clearly established" only when the precedent leaves no
room for argument.1 72 In the proposed ambiguity analysis, by
contrast, the law must be so unclear that it is ambiguous even
after being subjected to standard statutory interpretation. The
judge in the qualified immunity context is one step removed,
asking whether a reasonable person could make a contrary ar-
gument. But implementing the ambiguity test, the judge need
not maintain this detachment. Instead, she should directly ana-
lyze the statute, asking whether it is possible to ascertain the
meaning of the statute at issue. Only if the judge is unable to
identify the meaning should the claim of reasonable mistake be
allowed. This is in line with the Heien majority's insistence that
the standard should be more rigorous than that for qualified
immunity and with Kagan's concurring statement that "the
statute must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very hard question of
statutory interpretation."'173
Second, the ambiguity approach will rein in the scope of
police discretion in the aftermath of Heien. Professor Karen
McDonald Henning fleshed out this point in her scholarship on
Heien.174 The basic point is that an ambiguity test ensures that
police do not have unlimited scope for making mistakes. The po-
lice have the potential to make a reasonable mistake only about
the limited universe of statutes that are in fact ambiguous. This
eliminates the possibility of a police officer's rational ignorance
of the law being excused as a reasonable mistake. Instead, to
claim the benefits of Heien on behalf of the police, officers would
have to rely on finding a statute that causes problems for a
trained legal interpreter.
Third, the difference in analysis between the ambiguity test
and the "clearly established" test highlights differing policy con-
siderations that constitute the background for Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine, respectively.
The Fourth Amendment directly protects individuals from
government scrutiny and intrusion without cause.175 Qualified
172 See Pearson, 555 US at 231.
173 Heien, 135 S Ct at 541 (Kagan concurring).
174 See Henning, 70 St John's L Rev at 307-13 (cited in note 16).
175 See Florida v Jardines, 133 S Ct 1409, 1414 (2013).
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immunity protects police officers from excessive liability and is a
doctrinal tool for managing a trade-off that comes from the im-
position of civil liability on public officers. On the one hand, the
imposition of civil liability deters police from wrongdoing, but on
the other hand, one might be concerned that police will be over-
deterred and not enforce the law zealously enough if they have
to worry too much about doing something wrong. Qualified
immunity is an effort to avoid overdeterrence.176 In qualified
immunity cases, it is arguably appropriate to have a broader
protection for the police than it is when simply defining the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. For qualified immunity, pro-
tecting law enforcement is the primary objective; for the Fourth
Amendment, restraining law enforcement is high on the list of
values to be advanced.177 Differentiating the standards for quali-
fied immunity and the ambiguity test in Heien can be thought of
as a way of directing the emphasis toward these different con-
siderations in the different kinds of cases.
Finally, the ambiguity test has the virtue of directing the
judicial focus off of the officer and toward the law and the legis-
lature that framed it. It is the legislature that actually has con-
trol over whether the law is capable of being reasonably misun-
derstood. This Comment addresses this point in connection with
the rule of lenity.
176 On this point, the Court has commented:
When government officials abuse their offices, "action[s] for damages may offer
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." On the
other hand, permitting damages suits against government officials can entail
substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary lia-
bility and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of
their duties. Our cases have accommodated these conflicting concerns by gen-
erally providing government officials performing discretionary functions with a
qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated.
Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted). See also Harlow v
Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 814 (1982).
177 To point out that the emphases of Fourth Amendment doctrine and of the doc-
trine of qualified immunity, respectively, are quite different is not to deny that there is
occasional overlap. A legal realist recognizes that both affect the scope of policing. The
Court has occasionally been willing to use a balancing analysis in the Fourth Amendment
context, taking the state's interest in crime prevention into account. See, for example,
Maryland v King, 133 S Ct 1958, 1973 (2013). For a critical analysis of the "free-form"
balancing in King, see generally David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment
Balancing, Per Se Rules, and DNA Databases after Maryland v. King, 104 J Crim L &
Crimin 535 (2014). Still, the considerations balanced in the qualified immunity context
and the Fourth Amendment context are rather different.
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C. Problems with Alternative Glosses on Heien's
Reasonableness Standard
Two alternatives to the ambiguity standard can be found in
the Heien litigation. One alternative, suggested at oral argu-
ment, is that courts should look for an affirmative basis in the
statute for the mistake.178 The other alternative is a judge-
focused analysis, which can be found in one part of Justice
Kagan's concurrence. Neither is as clear as the ambiguity analysis.
1. An affirmative basis in the statute for the mistake.
At the Heien oral argument, Assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral Rachel Kovner proposed a standard that would differentiate
the Heien reasonable-mistake standard from the qualified im-
munity "clearly established" standard: "We think that an officer,
in order to have reasonable grounds for a stop, needs to be able
to point to something in the statute that affirmatively supports
his view."179 Kovner suggested that this was "essentially the
opposite" of the qualified immunity standard, which "seems to
require that there's a precedent that forecloses what the officer
does in order to protect only those who were acting-to protect
everybody except for those who are clearly incompetent."180
The Court in Heien did not adopt the test proposed by the
Assistant to the Solicitor General. Heien does not indicate that
the government had to point to something in the statute that
affirmatively supported the (mistaken) view of the officer. There
is a good reason for that. It is hard to imagine what this would
look like in practice. Any time someone misunderstands a stat-
ute, it is possible to point to some part of the statute that the in-
dividual read differently from the reviewing court. The officer
may read line one of the statute as controlling over line two or
read the first word in the statute more broadly than the court
did; in either case, the mistake is based on something that is
affirmatively in the statute. Another version of this test would
be to require that the officer find something in the statute that
specifically condoned the officer's behavior. But if the officer
could find this-and still be mistaken about the law-then very
likely the statute is in the zone of ambiguity, and thus redun-
dant with the ambiguity test.
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2. A judge-centric test.
In her concurrence in Heien, Kagan articulated a test (or set
of tests) that focuses on judges in order to determine when a
mistake of law could be reasonable. Parsing her opinion carefully,
it is possible to distinguish two different versions of the test. But
each is subject to serious objections.
First, a police mistake of law could be reasonable when
"different judges 'h[o]ld opposite opinions."'181 In other words, if
a judge interprets the statute as meaning X, and the police of-
ficer had read the statute as meaning Y, the police officer's mis-
take would be found to be reasonable if the officer had agreed
with some judges on the topic (imagine that the officer was read-
ing the statute in light of a nonbinding district-court opinion).
Read literally, this approach would be the reverse of the quali-
fied immunity test: the government loses unless two or more
judges have actually considered the issue and came to differing
conclusions. Contrast this with the qualified immunity standard
in which the police officer loses only if precedent actually makes
the issue clear. This version of Kagan's test at first appears to be
a tough standard-it would require a split among courts. But it
could also apply if a case was decided by a multi-judge panel and
a dissent was generated (showing that judges take opposite posi-
tions). This wouldn't work in practice because a case that gener-
ates an on-point dissent would generally decide the relevant
issue in the majority-and it would be a very odd rule indeed
that would allow the government to claim a reasonable mistake
in the face of an on-point decision to the contrary, on the
grounds that the police officer agreed with the dissenting judge.
This of course would make the standard more forgiving to the of-
ficer than that for qualified immunity and thus has to be wrong.
The second version of the judge-centric test would inquire
whether "a reasonable judge could agree with the officer's
view";182 if so, then it is possible for a police mistake of law to be
reasonable. But this simply shifts the analytical problem else-
where. Instead of asking whether a reasonable law enforcement
official could have made a mistake, it asks whether a reasonable
judge could do so.183 This in turn invites endless debate about
181 Heien, 135 S Ct at 541 (Kagan concurring).
182 Id (emphasis added).
183 One might object that the turn to lenity, proposed below, is actually just another
form of shifting the problem because different judges will have different ideas about
when a statute is ambiguous. But the judge-centric test obscures more than it clarifies
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what kind of interpretive methods are appropriate and how
much room any particular method leaves for reasonable judges
to disagree. Would a textualist who reads a given statute as say-
ing A be willing to say that a "reasonable judge" could rely on
legislative history in order to read the same statute as saying B?
Given that smart and respected judges take a wide range of ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation (compare, for example,
Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook,184 Seventh Circuit
benchmates), it seems unlikely that many judges would end up
concluding that their colleagues' methods of interpretation were
unreasonable.185 A generous estimation of colleagues' abilities
would again lead to an extraordinarily lenient standard for the
police. It would be very similar to a test employed in the context
of habeas corpus (specifically, when there is federal postconvic-
tion review of state detention), which asks whether "fairminded
jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts
with [the Supreme] Court's precedents."186 The habeas writ will
issue only when "no fairminded jurist" could disagree.187 This
test has been widely criticized as mandating extreme defer-
ence, 188 if not condemned as totally unworkable.189 With the
majority and concurrence in Heien emphasizing that the stand-
ard is to be a rigorous one, it is hard to imagine that the Court
would want to import the extremely deferential test from the
because it requires judges to make this judgment one level removed. It is one thing for a
judge to construe a statute strictly. It is quite another for that same judge to be required
to guess whether other judges employing different methods would do the same. Arguing
about whether a reasonable judge would read a given statute in a particular way is quite
different from a judge actually concluding that a given statute is ambiguous.
184 See Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation
of Tax Statutes, 51 Tax L Rev 677, 682 (1996) (characterizing Posner as a proponent of
"updated intentionalism"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 62, 67-70 (1994) (criticizing the focus on
purpose).
185 For a recent argument that judges should have the "epistemic humility" to re-
spect their colleagues (even in disagreement), see Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
The Votes of Other Judges, 105 Georgetown L J 159, 166 (2016) ("All nine Justices should
recognize that reasonable minds can disagree about the proper approach to interpreta-
tion, at least within conventional boundaries that comfortably include self-identified tex-
tualists, self-identified purposivists, self-identified intentionalists, and various hybrids.").
186 Harrington v Richter, 562 US 86, 102 (2011).
187 See id.
188 See, for example, Michael M. O'Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective
Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompe-
tence, 25 Fed Sent Rptr 110, 115 (2012).
189 See, for example, Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement about Disagreement: The Effect of
a Circuit Split or "Other Circuit" Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief
for State Convicts, 82 U Cin L Rev 831, 857 (2014).
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habeas context. If the deferential habeas test were adopted, the
tendency would be toward deference to police conduct that is
very likely as great as that in the qualified immunity context.
The Heien majority did not spell out exactly how to recog-
nize a reasonable mistake of law. But it did offer a clue in its
reference to qualified immunity as to how the reasonable mis-
take standard should be developed. Focusing the inquiry on
whether the statute itself was ambiguous sets that standard in
accord with the clues the Court has given. It also has analytical
clarity that other potential glosses on Heien lack.
IV. DEFINING AMBIGUITY: THE CASE FOR LINKING HEIEN TO
LENITY
If Heien requires an ambiguity test, the next question is
how to identify ambiguity. This Part argues that the ambiguity
test should be linked to the rule of lenity, as at least one court
has done.9O First, the rule of lenity already has a developed body
of case law construing ambiguity. The courts should utilize this
framework rather than reinvent the proverbial wheel. Second,
drawing on the rule of lenity to establish the standard for police
makes for the proper symmetry between the pro-defendant sub-
stantive rule and the pro-police Heien rule.
190 See People v Gaytan, 32 NE3d 641, 651 (11 2015). Gaytan invoked the rule of len-
ity when interpreting the statute on which a vehicle stop was predicated and concluded
that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to render the police officer's mistaken read-
ing reasonable. The court in Gaytan did not address the issue of whether ambiguity was
required or consider how lenity fit in the overall interpretive picture vis-A-vis Heien.
Relatedly, the Vermont Supreme Court used the rule of lenity as an aid to statutory in-
terpretation to support its narrow interpretation of a vehicle-equipment statute, and
then invoked Heien to conclude that a stop based on an incorrect reading of the statute
was not a Fourth Amendment violation. See State v Hurley, 117 A3d 433, 441 (Vt 2015).
The court said that the statute in question was ambiguous like the statute in Heien and
that "[t]he fact that our decision in this case resolves a split among several Vermont trial
courts on this question is reflective of the difficulty of the question, and the reasonable-
ness of the officer's mistaken interpretation of the statute." Id. It is not entirely clear
whether the court viewed the statute as ambiguous for purposes of statutory interpreta-
tion. See id. See also People v Wilmot, 2013 WL 951109, *9 n 2 (Mich App) (Gleicher dis-
senting) (suggesting that the majority should have construed the statute in favor of the
defendant under the rule of lenity).
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A. Options for Defining Ambiguity in the Heien Context
Determining that a statute is ambiguous can be a challeng-
ing matter.191 But this is not a problem unique to the Heien con-
text. Courts regularly confront confusingly worded statutes in
every field of law, and a significant body of case law and scholar-
ship on statutory interpretation is devoted to the resolution of
these issues.192
Consider two extremes as possible interpretations of ambi-
guity.193 At the restrictive extreme, only those statutes that were
impossible to understand using ordinary tools of interpretation
would be considered ambiguous. On this account, very little
would count as ambiguous.194 At the inclusive extreme, any stat-
ute open to more than one reading is ambiguous. This would ex-
pand the universe of ambiguity to the point that almost all stat-
utes are ambiguous.195 Somewhere in between is a workable
alternative, and it has to be defined in a way that makes sense
in the criminal context. Professor Gregory Maggs suggested as a
working definition that a statute should be considered "ambigu-
ous with respect to an issue if a lawyer would litigate the issue
in court."196 But whatever its merits as a realist criterion for rec-
ognizing a certain kind of ambiguity, this definition is not likely
to be helpful for a judge trying to decide whether an issue of
statutory meaning actually litigated is ambiguous. Moreover,
the calculus of when an issue will be litigated as opposed to
when it will be settled might be different in the civil context and
in the criminal context. The monetary calculations as to when
settlement is justified in the civil context are largely inapplica-
ble in the criminal context, in which the interest is in avoiding a
191 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative
Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 Harv J Legis 123, 125 (1992)
(considering definitions of ambiguity); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administra-
tive Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 516 (noting two possible meanings of
ambiguity in congressional statutes and in the administrative-law context).
192 See Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan L Rev
627, 628 (2002) (noting that "judges and scholars have developed an arsenal of interpre-
tive techniques that are designed to extract functional meaning from ambiguous statuto-
ry text and conflicting legislative history"); id at 642-48 (describing judicial responses to
ambiguity).
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criminal record.197 As a judicial standard, it seems unlikely that
an analysis that fluctuates with the rates of how many cases go
to trial is going to be manageable (or to create appropriate in-
centives for attorneys).
The typical definition of an ambiguous law is a law open to
more than one relevant meaning.198 Some would further distin-
guish ambiguity from "conceptual" problems, when it is unclear
what a given term in the law means, 199 a situation sometimes
treated with the vagueness doctrine.200 But often, courts have
treated such ambiguity in criminal law under the rule of lenity,
using lenity to choose the narrower of several possible meanings
and thereby avoiding the determination that a given ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague.201
The key points for present purposes are twofold. First,
ambiguity is not self-defining. There are multiple possible ap-
proaches to identifying ambiguity, and so there are choices to be
made. Second, lenity is not the only version of ambiguity to come
up in the criminal-law context, but it is the best one to consider
in relation to Heien. Vagueness is the other obvious approach to
dealing with ambiguous statutes in the criminal-law context.202
But vagueness is an extreme diagnosis (leading to the invalida-
tion of the statute).203 Lenity's consequences are less drastic (it
acquits a criminal defendant but does not invalidate the crimi-
nal law under which that defendant was charged), and so serves
as a more logical default for considering ambiguity in the criminal-
law context.
Lenity also addresses the interpretation of criminal stat-
utes, the same statutes that the police are to be enforcing in the
Heien context. Today, the rule of lenity in federal courts has
197 See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37
Stan L Rev 589, 605-06 (1985) (suggesting a distinction between a lawyer's role as their
client's advocate in a criminal trial versus a civil suit). Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.1 (ABA 1983) allows criminal defense lawyers more leeway to litigate issues
than it permits to lawyers outside the criminal context.
198 See Waldron, 82 Cal L Rev at 512 (cited in note 126).
199 See Solan, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 58, 62-86 (cited in note 144).
200 See generally, for example, Papachristou v City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156 (1972).
201 See Solan, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev at 58, 62-86 (cited in note 144).
202 See, for example, Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal
Statutes-Balancing Acts, 5 Va J Soc Pol & L 1, 9-16 (1997); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate
and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 Am Crim L Rev 391, 392 (1994)
("Ambiguity is not, however, a new topic to criminal law as vague terms exist throughout
our statutes.").
203 See, for example, Papachristou, 405 US at 162.
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typically been employed with a restrictive understanding of am-
biguity: a statute is ambiguous only when none of the ordinary
tools of statutory interpretation can resolve its meaning, leaving
only lenity to break the tie.204 This restrictive version of lenity
makes it difficult for criminal defendants to succeed in argu-
ments based on lenity. But if the rule of lenity in its current
form is imported to the Heien context, it will also have little tol-
erance for a police officer's mistakes. One could imagine that
this would still work even if the courts were to change their view
of lenity. Suppose that courts rejected the currently dominant
narrow view of lenity, which puts lenity at the bottom of the
hierarchy (and is thus hard on defendants), in exchange for a
Justice Scalia-style rule of lenity that is more generous to de-
fendants.205 This more generous (to defendants) view of lenity
invokes the principle whenever there are multiple possible read-
ings of a statute-on this strong form of lenity, the court should
simply look at the interpretive options and pick the most
defendant-friendly version. If Heien draws on this version of len-
ity, police would have a wider scope for making reasonable mis-
takes, even as defendants have more protection when charged
under certain ambiguous laws.
B. A Basis in Heien for Linking Lenity and Reasonableness
The Heien case did not rely on lenity for its analysis.206 Still,
it is possible to find a logical connection between the Heien
Court's proffered "symmetry" rationale and lenity. In responding
to the argument that Heien contradicts the principle that "igno-
rance of the law is no excuse," Chief Justice Roberts argued that
the principle was being misapplied.207 The "true symmetry," he
argued, is that an "individual generally cannot escape criminal
204 See Price, 72 Fordham L Rev at 891 (cited in note 127).
205 See Hopwood, 54 Am Crim L Rev at 717-20 (cited in note 134).
206 Note that North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that any ambiguity in a
criminal statute should be resolved under the rule of lenity. See, for example, State v
Smith, 373 SE2d 435, 437 (NC 1988); State v Heavner, 741 SE2d 897, 901-02 (NC App
2013). So the fact that the lower courts in Heien did not invoke the rule of lenity does not
necessarily mean that the lenity test proposed in this Comment is incompatible with, or
would have led to a different outcome in, Heien. A skeptic could make an argument that
the problem in Heien is that the lower court did not even hold the statute at issue to be
ambiguous, which undercuts Justice Kagan's concurrence and the various courts that
have already employed an ambiguity analysis in their application of Heien. See, for ex-
ample, United States v Diaz, 854 F3d 197, 204 (2d Cir 2017) (stating that the Heien ma-
jority characterized the North Carolina taillight law as ambiguous).
207 See Heien, 135 S Ct at 540.
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liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law," and
likewise "the government cannot impose criminal liability based
on a mistaken understanding of the law."208 In other words, Heien
limits the Fourth Amendment's application to those situations
in which the police are unreasonably mistaken about the law,
but it does not undo the essential symmetry between the de-
fendant and the government when it comes to criminal convic-
tions. Ignorance of the law is not a defense, and on the other
hand the government cannot convict someone when the govern-
ment is mistaken about the law under which the defendant is
charged.
This passage in the majority opinion may not mandate the
joining of Heien and lenity, but it fits nicely with the lenity prin-
ciple. Linking Heien and lenity maintains and promotes the
symmetry sought by the Heien majority. The focus is on the
statute on which the police activity was predicated. If a statute
is ambiguous, the police may be able to search. But the defend-
ant could not be convicted if charged with violating the predicate
statute because the rule of lenity would mandate that the most
defendant-friendly version of the statute be adopted. Recall that
in Heien, the defendant was not charged with violating the pred-
icate statute (the vehicle regulation), but instead was charged
with violating the narcotics law. This is the usual application of
Heien, justifying a stop based on an ambiguous traffic law that
then leads to the discovery of fruits or instrumentalities of
crime, and it is then only the latter that is charged.
The importance of symmetry also suggests that the court
should apply the version of the rule of lenity that would be ap-
plicable in a prosecution under the statute. If the predicate
crime would be prosecutable only in federal court, then the fed-
eral rule of lenity would apply; if the predicate crime would be
prosecuted in state court, then the state version of the rule
should be applied. This would matter when state and federal ar-
ticulations of the rule of lenity differed.209 The alternative would
be to apply a federal rule of lenity to interpret the federal Fourth
Amendment. While this has the appeal of federal uniformity, it
comes at a cost to the value of symmetry. If the rule of lenity ap-
plied in the Heien context was different than the rule of lenity
applied in a local prosecution for the predicate offense, then a
208 Id.
209 For state approaches to lenity, see Love, Comment, 121 Yale L J at 2397-99
(cited in note 144).
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police officer could get the benefit of Heien even though a de-
fendant does not get the benefit of lenity as a defense to the sub-
stantive predicate offense. Meanwhile, the importance of federal
uniformity here is probably not all that great; it adds a bit of
interpretive predictability across states but only at the cost of
greater interpretive dissonance between state and federal
courts. And requiring a federal interpretation of a state law
would arguably violate established federalism principles.210 This
consideration in itself tips the balance in favor of using the
state's rule of lenity.
C. The Structural Case for Focusing on the Statute
It is appropriate to focus the Heien test more closely on the
state of the law rather than on the acts of the police. The lenity
standard appropriately focuses the inquiry on the condition of
the statute. To the extent one worries about police being de-
terred from doing their job by concerns about enforcing ambigui-
ties in the law, the expansion of reasonable mistake to include
mistakes of law was itself responsive to that concern. To the ex-
tent that one worries about police expending resources trying to
understand the law under the objective test, the legislature can
fix that. 211 This process respects the legislature's control over
substantive criminal law. The lenity analysis proposed here puts
the burden on the legislature to ensure that the police's job is
clear.212
The same point can be made in terms of notice. The rule of
lenity traditionally emphasizes notice to defendants, and it
makes sense to also consider notice to the police officer. If the
defendant was not on notice that his conduct was unlawful, then
210 See United States v DeGasso, 369 F3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir 2004) ("If the state
supreme court has not interpreted a provision of the state's statutory code, the federal
court 'must predict how the court would interpret the code in light of [state] appellate
court opinions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, and treatises."'), quoting
United States v Colin, 314 F3d 439, 443 (9th Cir 2002).
211 See generally Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J Crim L
& Crimin 537 (2012).
212 It is entirely possible that the legislature pays no attention to whether the police's
job is clear or not. Still, so long as the Court is interested in preserving symmetry between
treatment of police and treatment of criminal defendants under the law, then it makes
as much sense to trust the legislature here as it does in the lenity context. For support
that there is a general preference for legislative, rather than judicial handling, of crimi-
nal definitions, see United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 348 (1971). If the legislature is
troubled by the treatment of either the criminal defendant or the erring police officer,
then it can (but of course does not have to) respond by clarifying the law.
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it would contravene the legality principle to punish him for
engaging in it.213 Similarly, the police officer is charged with
enforcing laws,214 but if the officer did not have notice that par-
ticular conduct was outside the scope of the law because the law
itself was ambiguous, then it makes little sense to penalize the
officer.
It is possible that focusing on the state of the statute could
have perverse incentive effects: if the legislature is ambiguous,
the police have more rather than less power.215 But in applying
the rule of lenity, the courts have the resources to check a legis-
lature that gets careless in drafting or that even attempts to put
some strategic ambiguity into a law to help out the police-the
legislature does so only at the expense of not being able to get
convictions on the substantive law. Indeed, this might be a fea-
ture, rather than a bug, of the Supreme Court's approach. It is
not the fault of the police if the legislature is unclear. If the leg-
islature wants to ensure that police have extensive investigative
authority, the legislature can provide for this by enacting lots of
regulations. If voters do not like these regulations, they can
make them into a political issue. The courts will help to narrow
the substantive laws, while still being generous to the police in
the procedural context through rules like the one in Heien.
D. Lenity and the Tempering of the Substance/Procedure
Divide
At a more conceptual level, the lenity standard might ad-
dress a concern that has motivated at least part of the criticism
of the Heien decision. The Supreme Court's approach to criminal
procedure has been criticized-especially in the critical reactions
to Heien-for separating substance from procedure and for being
out of touch with the substantive criminal-law issues of over-
criminalization and excessive police discretion.216
For some critics of Heien, a cardinal sin of that decision is
that it facilitated expanded police discretion at a time when po-
lice discretion is already enormous, thanks to the vast number of
213 See, for example, United States v R.L.C., 503 US 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214 See DeFillippo, 443 US at 38 (Tolice are charged to enforce laws until and unless
they are declared unconstitutional.").
215 See Henning, 90 St John's L Rev at 313 n 232 (cited in note 16).
216 See, for example, Kinports, 68 Ala L Rev at 124 (cited in note 61).
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laws on the books.217 There is, for example, already an enormous
body of law and regulation governing vehicles and driving, and if
a police officer wants to stop a driver, he can almost always find
a reason.218 Heien appears almost gratuitous, giving police offic-
ers virtual carte blanche. Crucial here is the interplay between
the substantive law (extensive traffic regulation) and procedural
law (in this case, the Fourth Amendment rules governing
investigations).
There are two issues that provide a backdrop to the case.
One is that the Court has for quite some time worried about the
social costs that might come any time it institutes a rule that
deters police searches. The Court has suggested that there are
significant social costs (in terms of reducing the effectiveness of
policing) every time it imposes further restrictions or liabilities
on the police.219 One might reasonably suspect some of these con-
cerns are in the background in Heien, despite the fact that the
case on its face simply determines what constitutes a violation of
the Fourth Amendment without addressing the remedy. If this
is true, then Heien is simply another way of making law en-
forcement's job easier.22o An alternative perspective is that the
greater social costs arise when police have too much discretion
217 See, for example, McAdams, 2015 Sup Ct Rev at 165 (cited in note 28); Henning, 90
St John's L Rev at 310 (cited in note 16); Kinports, 68 Ala L Rev at 124 (cited in note 61).
218 See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 3-4 (Harvard
2011). See also Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 818-19 (1996).
219 See, for example, Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638 (1987) (describing costs
in the qualified immunity context); Utah v Strieff, 136 S Ct 2056, 2061 (2016) (referenc-
ing social costs in the exclusionary rule context).
220 Other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine have been more transparent about
this motivation. For instance, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule provides
that evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible when the
Fourth Amendment violation was committed by an officer relying in good faith on a
defective search warrant. See generally United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984);
Massachusetts v Sheppard, 468 US 981 (1984). Similarly, in the habeas corpus context,
the Supreme Court has developed a set of doctrines that require a showing of "clear
error" and "objectively unreasonable" conduct before granting relief, which critics have
accused of being excessively hard on defendants. See Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 405
(2000) (holding that a lower-court opinion, to be contrary to federal law, has to be not
just wrong, but directly contrary to a Supreme Court precedent on a rule of law or on
"facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent");
Lockyer v Andrade, 538 US 63, 75-76 (2003) (holding that the lower court's application of
legal principle must be objectively unreasonable, which is more than merely "incorrect or
erroneous"). For an example of criticism of this approach, see Stephen R. Reinhardt, The
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increas-
ing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich L Rev 1219, 1227 (2015).
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and policing can be done in a discriminatory manner. 22 1 The is-
sue is in the background of much of Fourth Amendment law,
though it has been most thoroughly analyzed and debated in the
context of the exclusionary rule,222 generating a substantial
scholarly literature but still no consensus about the rule's ulti-
mate value.223
This Comment does not attempt to resolve the debate
about the social costs of deterring police searches. But it does
have something to say about the second background considera-
tion involved in discussions of Heien; namely, that the Court
could take into account the high rates of criminalization and
accordingly tighten the Fourth Amendment rules so as to reduce
the scope of police discretion. The Court has not generally been
interested in trying to think about the Fourth Amendment in re-
lation to the amount of substantive criminal law on the books.
Instead, the Court crafts its rules of criminal procedure to be
transsubstantive.224 That is, the Court decides rules of procedure
without regard to the kind of substantive criminal law at issue
in the background.225 There are costs to this approach: Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is sometimes complicated or distorted
when it is applied in a one-size-fits-all manner across different
221 See generally, for example, Hassel, 64 Mo L Rev 123 (cited in note 117).
222 The exclusionary rule is a remedy for violation of the Fourth Amendment, not a
personal claim against the individual officer. It has been the subject of much discussion
because its objective is often said to be the deterrence of police misconduct under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court has often talked about the exclusionary rule in terms of a
cost-benefit tradeoff between deterring police misconduct versus overdeterring good
policing. See, for example, Strieff, 136 S Ct at 2061. For a discussion on the Supreme
Court's analysis of deterrence, see generally Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and
the Exclusionary Rule, 21 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 821 (2013).
223 For representative studies, see generally Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 585 (argu-
ing that the social cost has been minimal); Myron W. Orfield Jr, Deterrence, Perjury, and
the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U Colo L
Rev 75 (1992) (suggesting that the rule actually does deter police misconduct and incen-
tivizes better institutional compliance with the Fourth Amendment); Kenworthey Bilz,
Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J
Empirical Legal Stud 149 (2012) (arguing that exclusionary rule has little deterrent
effect). See also generally Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest
on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L Rev
565 (1983) (arguing that empirical studies will never be able to provide a stable answer
to the question whether the exclusionary rule is cost-justified).
224 See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv L Rev 842, 847 (2001).
225 See id. See also Whren, 517 US at 818-19.
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legal contexts. 226 One good justification for this approach is
structural.227 If there is a problem with overregulation (of vehi-
cles on the roads, for example), that is not a problem to be dealt
with by a court setting rules of constitutional criminal proce-
dure. It should be dealt with by the democratic legislature.
Courts would speak to the issue only insofar as the courts have
the opportunity to construe the statutes. The Fourth Amendment
is a limitation on the ways that police enforce the criminal law,
not on the scope of coverage of the law itself.
What is interesting about Heien is that it opens the door for
the Court to consider the coverage of the substantive criminal
law, because the Court has to construe that substantive criminal
law before deciding whether the search at issue was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. This is when lenity comes in. For
realists who are troubled by the Court's tendency to treat sub-
stance and procedure as separate, linking Heien to lenity would
help by building a link between the two into the rule itself. As
noted above, it would mean that the currently dominant version
of lenity that is harder on defendants would also be harder on
law enforcement.
The practical relevance of linking Heien and lenity can be
seen more clearly from the perspective of a litigator trying to
reduce the range of police discretion. Putting together Heien and
lenity offers a couple of practical strategic options. On those
occasions when the traffic violations on which the stop was pred-
icated are charged, they can of course be challenged on lenity
grounds. More often, though, these predicate violations will not
be charged. But public interest groups would still have options.
When the substantive offense is not charged in a particular case,
litigators interested in reducing the ambiguity of the law would
then be alerted to the possibility of bringing lenity defenses in
other cases in which the offense is charged. Most of these
predicate laws will doubtless remain in the traffic and vehicle
context, an area in which we might doubt that the "one-way
ratchet" in favor of harsher and more expansive criminal law
applies.228
226 See Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise
(and Fall) Together, 83 U Chi L Rev 139, 140 (2016).
227 This argument builds on Price, 72 Fordham L Rev at 894 (cited in note 127).
228 It is worth noting that traffic and vehicle regulations are areas of law in which
people who otherwise consider themselves "law-abiding" are most likely to disregard the
law, see, for example, Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 3 (cited in note
218), and correspondingly likely to imagine themselves as potential lawbreakers. It is far
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Imagine how the Indiana case from the Introduction229 could
have been analyzed under an ambiguity-lenity gloss on Heien.
First, the court could have considered the statute on which the
stop was predicated, requiring the vehicle to have a red taillight.
The court would then invoke the rule of lenity, which the state's
supreme court has said "requires that penal statutes be con-
strued strictly against the State," with "ambiguities resolved in
favor of the accused."230 The court had already interpreted the
statutory text; the statute was not exactly pellucid, but there
was certainly no indication it was ambiguous.231 As a result, the
court would have had to conclude that the police mistake was
not reasonable. The analysis would be clear and the standard for
reasonable mistake demanding-just as the Heien court indicated
it should be.232
CONCLUSION
The Heien case has left the lower courts with a range of
options for developing the reasonable-mistake-of-law standard.
This Comment has argued that a reasonable mistake of law is
best identified only when the criminal statute, on which the
police relied in deciding to execute a search or seizure, is ambig-
uous. Moreover, this Comment has proposed that ambiguity
should be defined in the same manner here as it is in the lenity
cases. On this approach, a court confronted with an alleged
instance of a reasonable mistake of law should ask, first, wheth-
er the predicate criminal statute (on which the police officer mis-
takenly relied) would be held ambiguous for purposes of lenity.
Only if the statute would be ambiguous in that context should
the police officer be able to get the benefit of Heien's reasonable-
mistake rule.
Linking Heien to the rule of lenity provides a way to draw
on an already-developed jurisprudence about ambiguity in the
criminal law. It is a rigorous requirement for the police, compat-
ible with the Heien majority's requirement that the standard be
from a direct strategy to roll back police discretion, but it is a possible route for grass-
roots work coupled with impact litigation that might have an impact on the traffic laws.
229 Williams v State, 28 NE3d 293, 295 (Ind App 2015) ("Williams II").
230 Meredith v State, 906 NE2d 867, 872 (Ind 2009).
231 See Williams v State, 22 NE3d 730, 734 (Ind App 2014) ("Williams I").
232 See Heien, 135 S Ct at 539-40.
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tougher than the qualified immunity standard.233 It is the best
means to foster the symmetry between the substantive criminal
law and the Fourth Amendment rule that the Heien majority
purported to seek.234 And it means that each case that finds that
the police made a reasonable mistake will also provide litigants
with a roadmap to ambiguous laws for which the courts would
be receptive to lenity arguments in the appropriate case. A
search for statutory ambiguity cabins police discretion to some
extent, and it also has the virtue of focusing attention on the
role of the legislature in drafting the law rather than on the po-
lice in construing the law. This is appropriate when the legisla-
ture is the real cause of the mistakes (because it has drafted un-
clear laws).
One can imagine a doctrinal spectrum, from permissive to
severe in its attitude toward the government. Qualified immunity
would be fairly far on one end (permissive to police) while the
rule of lenity, applied in the Heien context to limit the occasions
when police are protected, would be equally far on the other
(stringent on prosecution). Critics have assumed that the Heien
rule belongs closer to the permissive end of the spectrum. This
Comment has suggested, however, that it would be entirely logi-
cal, and consistent with the Heien opinion, to link Heien to lenity
and thus put the Heien standard closer to the stringent end of
the spectrum. Using lenity to define ambiguity can clarify the
courts' analysis and, in the process, reduce the scope of unfet-
tered police discretion that has troubled many observers in the
aftermath of Heien.
233 Id at 539.
234 Id at 540.
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